Mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions. Recent philosophy of mind has seen a growing interest in mental fictionalism. To date, much of the discussion has concerned the general features of the approach. In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton's work on make-believe. According to the approach I propose, talk of mental states is a useful pretence for describing people and their behaviour. I try to clarify and motivate this approach by comparing it to well-known alternatives, including behaviourism, instrumentalism and eliminativism. I also consider some of the challenges that it faces.
Introduction
How should we make sense of ordinary talk about the mind? When we say that someone has a particular belief or desire, are we claiming that they have a certain sort of causal state inside their heads? If we are, might future cognitive science show that we are wrong? Might it turn out that mental states, like beliefs and desires, do not exist? In this paper, I explore one way to approach these longstanding questions concerning the status of folk psychology: mental fictionalism. Put simply, mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions.
Recent philosophy of mind has seen a growing interest in mental fictionalism (e.g. Wallace 2007 , Demeter 2013a . To date, much of the discussion has concerned the general features of this approach and the difficulties it faces.
1 In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton's work on makebelieve (Walton 1990 (Walton , 1993 . According to the account I will put forward, when we say someone has a particular belief or desire, we are not making a claim about their inner machinery. Instead, talk about mental states is a useful pretence for describing people and their behaviour. As a result, the legitimacy of ordinary talk about the mind does not depend upon whether future cognitive science will discover beliefs or desires inside our heads.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, in Section 2, I give a brief outline of Walton's theory, focusing on his discussion of metaphor and prop-oriented make-believe.
In Section 3, I show how we may draw on Walton's analysis to develop a fictionalist analysis of folk psychology. In Section 4, I further clarify and motivate this account by comparing it to a number of well-known alternative positions, including behaviourism, instrumentalism and eliminativism, as well as alternative forms of fictionalism. Finally, in Section 5, I consider some important challenges facing mental fictionalism.
1 An exception is Demeter (2013b) , who proposes a particular form of mental fictionalism that treats folk psychology as device for expressing an interpreter's affective reactions.
2 Prop-oriented make-believe
Imagine some children playing with a doll. They pick the doll up and hold it in their arms, push it down the hallway in a pushchair, cover it with a blanket, and so on. As they do so, the children imagine themselves picking up a baby and cradling it, taking it to the shops and lying it down in its cot to go to sleep. In Walton's theory, dolls and other objects used in make-believe are called props and the rules that govern their use in the game are called principles of generation (Walton 1990) . Within a game of make-believe, the properties of the props, together with the relevant principles of generation, make propositions fictional.
To say that a proposition is fictional, in Walton's sense, is simply to say that participants in the game are prescribed to imagine it. For example, if the doll's "eyes" are closed, the children are to imagine that the baby is asleep. It is fictional that the baby is asleep.
Notice that, since the content of a game of make-believe depends only on the props and principles of generation, it possesses a certain kind of "objectivity": if the doll's eyes are closed then it is fictional that the baby is asleep, even if none of the children happen to notice this.
One important feature of games of make-believe is participation. Children playing with a doll do not simply sit and look at it. Instead, they carry out various actions with the doll (e.g. putting a bottle to its "mouth") and these actions generate imaginings within the game (e.g. that the children are feeding the baby). Like the doll, the children themselves become props in the game. The children also participate verbally. For example, David might sing a lullaby as he rocks the doll in his arms, thereby making it fictional that he is singing a lullaby to get the baby to sleep. Importantly, acts of pretence can be used to make genuine assertions. Suppose that Anna looks at the doll and says "She's sleeping now!" When she says this, Anna pretends to assert that the baby is asleep. But she also indicates that pretending in this way is appropriate and, in doing so, makes a genuine assertion: she claims that the state of the props is such that to pretend in the way that she does is, fictionally, to speak the truth. In other words, Anna claims that the doll's "eyes" are closed. Once again, notice the objectivity of games: if, in fact, the doll's "eyes" are 4 open, then Anna's pretence is inappropriate and her assertion is false.
2
The reason that children play with dolls, it seems, is not because they are interested in the properties of the doll as such. Dolls are interesting only in so far as they allow the children to immerse themselves in a make-believe world in which they can cradle a baby, take it out in its pushchair, feed it or rock it to sleep. Walton (1993) another. (Walton 1993, pp. 40-41) In content oriented make-believe, our interest lies in the content of a make-believe world.
By contrast, in prop oriented make-believe, our interest lies in the props themselves; the role of make-believe is to help us to understand the props. Despite the difference between these forms of make-believe, Walton's analysis of utterances involving prop oriented make-believe parallels his analysis of utterances in the children's game. If Mark says "Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot", he is involved in pretence, much like Anna when she looks at the doll's eyes and exclaims "She's sleeping now!". And yet, just like Anna, Mark also makes a genuine assertion: he claims that the state of the props is such that to pretend in the way that he does is, fictionally, to speak the truth. In other words, Mark asserts that Crotone is in such-and-such a position on the Italian coastline. Invoking a familiar game of make-believe in which Italy is imagined to be a boot provides him with a more colourful and memorable way of communicating this fact.
Walton's theory has been influential amongst fictionalists in many domains (e.g. Crimmins 1998 , Joyce 2005 , Kroon 2001 , Yablo 2001 . In the next section, I show how it can be used to develop a form of mental fictionalism.
Folk psychology as fiction
I now want to suggest that we should understand ordinary talk about mental states in terms of pretence. One way to introduce this idea involves a twist on Wilfrid Sellars' famous myth about the origin of talk about mental states (Sellars 1956; cf. Yablo 2005 On this view, then, ordinary talk about the mind involves acts of pretence within a folk psychological game of make-believe. Within this game, we are to imagine that people have certain inner states inside their heads, such as beliefs and desires. We are also to imagine that these states arise in certain circumstances, interact in certain sorts of ways, and produce certain sorts of behaviour. We can capture some of the rules of the folk psychological game in various truisms. If someone is looking at an object in good light, then normally we are to imagine that they have a particular inner state (a belief) which says that there is an object in front of them. If someone hasn't eaten anything all day, then normally we are to imagine that they have a different sort of inner state (a desire) which says they should eat something. In general, however, the rules of the folk psychological game are notoriously difficult to specify. This need not pose a particular problem for the fictionalist, however. After all, the rules governing children's games are rarely explicitly formulated.
Why might someone be attracted to mental fictionalism? The most familiar motivation for fictionalism is a worry about ontological commitment (Wallace 2007) . Thus, the fictionalist might be persuaded by various arguments for eliminativism about mental states (e.g. Churchland 1981, Ramsey, Stich and Garon 1990) . And yet she might also worry that we cannot do without folk psychological talk. The fictionalist therefore aims to show how we can keep such talk around without being committed to the existence of mental states. There is also a rather different motivation for turning to mental fictionalism, however. Rather than being persuaded by arguments for eliminativism, the 8 fictionalist might primarily be interested in making sense of our ordinary talk about the mind. When we examine such talk closely, she might argue, we find that it is best understood in fictionalist terms: despite appearances to the contrary, in fact the folk are not committed to the existence of beliefs and desires as discrete inner causes of behaviour; instead, folk discourse treats these entities as useful fictions. A fictionalist who takes this approach endorses a hermeneutic, rather than revolutionary, fictionalism (Stanley 2001) : she presents fictionalism as a descriptive claim about folk discourse, rather than a prescription for how that discourse should be reinterpreted.
Tentatively, I wish to propose mental fictionalism as a hermeneutic fictionalism. Of course, folk discourse is complex and nuanced, and it might be difficult to capture this complexity in any single account (Dennett 1987 , Godfrey-Smith 2005 . Nevertheless, I
want to suggest that a fictionalist analysis captures the spirit of much of our ordinary talk about mental states. The guiding motivation behind this approach is familiar from behaviourist or instrumentalist approaches in general: the legitimacy of ordinary talk about the mind does not depend upon speculation about the machinery inside people's heads. The fictionalist analysis of ordinary folk discourse requires further defence, however. After all, it might be argued, when we attribute beliefs and desires to people, we don't normally feel as if we are pretending or engaging in a game of make-believe. I return to this objection in Section 5. First, however, I hope to clarify and motivate the fictionalist view in more detail by comparing it to a number of well-known alternative approaches to folk psychology.
Contrasts

Behaviourism
First, let us compare fictionalism to behaviourism. 3 Like fictionalism, behaviourism also claims that ordinary talk about the mind is not committed to the existence of beliefs and desires as inner causal states. However, the behaviourist tries to avoid commitment to such internal states by giving a reductive analysis of mental talk in terms of behaviour.
Thus, to say that John wants to go to Madrid is not to describe any state inside his head; it is to describe his tendencies in various circumstances: if he were browsing through travel guides, he would reach for the guide to Madrid; if he were in the airport, he would catch the plane for Madrid, and so on. The key problem for behaviourism, of course, is that filling out such analyses proves to be extremely difficult. The main reason for the failure of this project, it seems, is that there is no straightforward, one-to-one correspondence between individual mental states and behavioural dispositions. Instead, the behaviour that results from any individual mental state typically depends on many other mental states.
John's desire to go to Madrid will only lead him to catch a plane for Madrid if he also believes that planes fly, that the plane at the gate will take him to Madrid, and so on.
Along with the behaviourist, the hermeneutic fictionalist also argues that folk psychology is not committed to the existence of beliefs and desires as inner causal states. The key 3 Throughout this discussion, I will use the term "behaviourism" to refer to analytic, rather than methodological, behaviourism. While the analytical behaviourist offers an analysis of ordinary talk about mental states, the methodological behaviourist instead proposes a restriction on the proper object of psychological inquiry. For a classic defence of analytic behaviourism, see Ryle (1949) . For methodological behaviourism, see Skinner (1974 Ruth is not committed to the existence of such entities, according to the fictionalist, is simply because her utterance is not a straightforward assertion; instead, it is an act of pretence. Similarly, if we say, "Crotone is on the arch of the Italian boot" our utterance means the same as if we were (oddly enough) to claim that there really was an enormous boot floating in the Mediterranean. Within the context of the game, however, our utterance is recognised as pretence (Walton 1990 , 1993 , Yablo 1998 him to Madrid); taking the ferry to Santander and then the train (because he is scared of flying); wistfully thumbing through travel brochures (because he believes he can't afford to go to Madrid); and so on. Each of these counts as a situation in which the rules of folk psychology make it fictional that John desires to go to Madrid. And yet, just as there might be no way of capturing what is common to all clouds we call "angry" (apart from that they each make it fictional that they are angry), so there might be no way of capturing what is common to each of these forms of behaviour (apart from that they each make it fictional that John desires to go to Madrid). The problems faced by behaviourism thus turn out to be an instance of a more general phenomenon, namely the difficulty of giving a literal paraphrase for metaphors and figurative language.
Instrumentalism
It is also helpful to compare fictionalism to instrumentalism. Instrumentalism can be characterised in a number of different ways. Intentional systems theory aims to capture the principles underlying our ordinary belief and desire attributions (Dennett 1987 ).
According to David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson (2007, p. 159) , instrumentalism is the view that " [t] here is nothing more to being a believer and a desirer, a thing with beliefs and desires, than being a being whose behaviour is well predicted by [intentional systems theory]". Thus, the instrumentalist claims that 'S believes P and desires Q' is true iff (a) the behaviour of S is well predicted by intentional systems theory, and (b) the best belief and desire hypotheses according to the principles of intentional systems theory for predicting S's behaviour are that S believes P and desires Q (ibid.)
An important challenge for instrumentalism is provided by the Blockhead thought experiment (Block 1981 Daniel Dennett is often taken to be the leading proponent of instrumentalism. Of course, Dennett himself has rejected the label "instrumentalism" for his position, as well as "fictionalism" (Dennett 1987 (Dennett , 1991 in Section 3 offers a way to make sense of this idea (cf. Hutto 2013). When we say that a system has certain centre of gravity, we pretend that its mass is located at a certain point.
Taken literally, this is false. And yet, when we attribute a centre of gravity to a system, we also make a genuine assertion: we claim that the system's mass is distributed such that it is appropriate to pretend that all the mass is located at a particular point. And this claim can be straightforwardly true. Similarly, when we claim that someone has a certain belief, we pretend that they have a particular inner state. Taken literally, this is (or might be) false. And yet, when we attribute a belief, we also make a genuine assertion: we claim that they are in a particular state such that is appropriate to pretend in this way. And this claim can be straightforwardly true.
Notably, Dennett also insists that, although beliefs and desires might not exist, the patterns picked out by the intentional stance are nevertheless entirely real, objective features of the world (Dennett 1987 (Dennett , 1991 
Prefix-fictionalism
Many discussions of mental fictionalism focus mainly on a version of the approach that we might call prefix-fictionalism (Armour-Garb and Woodbridge 2015). On this view, utterances such as "John believes that planes can fly" are taken to be elliptical for prefixed claims like "In the folk psychological fiction, John believes that planes can fly" (Wallace 2007 , Parent 2013 Each of these difficulties confronts prefix versions of mental fictionalism. First, consider modality (cf. Wallace 2007, pp. 20-21) . Of course, unlike a claim like "2+2=4", we don't take attributions such as "John believes that planes can fly" to be necessarily true. And yet prefix-fictionalism still seems to run into difficulties here. Consider a possible world in which folk psychology turned out differently (perhaps our visionary Jones never lived, or took a different model as the inspiration for his revolutionary account of people's behaviour). According to prefix-fictionalism, in such a scenario, a claim such as "John believes that planes can fly" would be false, even if all of the facts about John and his aeroplane-related behaviour were exactly the same. This seems wrong: intuitively, I think, we should still count this as a world in which John believes that planes can fly. Or, to take another example, suppose that we grant that, since Freud's work, the notion of unconscious desires has become part of folk psychology. Again, it seems wrong to say that, had Freud never written, then all of our attributions of unconscious desires would be false. Second, consider the problem of concern. When we talk about people's mental lives (rather than, say, discuss philosophy of mind), what we care about are the people we are talking about, not the contents of folk psychological theory. Finally, when we say "John wants to go to Madrid" or John wants a new job", it certainly feels as if we are talking about John, not about the way the folk talk about John.
The pretence version of mental fictionalism avoids these worries. On the analysis I have proposed, attributions of mental states are not claims about the contents of folk psychological theory; instead, they are acts of pretence that serve to make claims about people and their behaviour. This allows the pretence fictionalist to respond to each of the difficulties facing prefix fictionalism. If we say (correctly) that "John believes that planes can fly", the claim we make is true in virtue of facts concerning John and his behaviour. If the contents of folk psychology were to change while the facts about John remained the same, then our claim would still be true. Similarly, our attributions of unconscious desires would retain their present truth values, even if Freud had never written. And the pretencefictionalist has no problem explaining why it is that, when we attribute mental states to John, it is John himself that we care about and whom we feel we are talking about:
according to the pretence analysis, that is precisely what we are doing, although we do so via the use of pretence.
The pretence version of mental fictionalism also avoids a further difficulty confronting prefix-fictionalism. As we have seen, the prefix-fictionalist claims that talk about mental states is talk about a folk psychological fiction. The guiding analogy here, of course, is with an utterance such as "Holmes smokes a pipe" which, according to prefixfictionalism, is short for "In the Sherlock Holmes stories, Holmes smokes a pipe". 4 And yet there seems to be an important difference between the two cases. After all, it is clear which fiction underpins our talk about Sherlock Holmes: we can point to our copy of Conan Doyle's stories. But there is no text that sets out the principles of folk psychology.
Indeed, as we saw earlier, such principles are notoriously difficult to formulate explicitly.
In this respect, mental fictionalism might seem to be in a worse position than fictionalism in other domains. For example, Gideon Rosen's (1990) modal fictionalism is able to draw on David Lewis' On the Plurality of Worlds (1986) to set out its guiding fiction. Of course, there are ways that the prefix fictionalist might try to respond to this worry (see Wallace 2007, pp. 9-11) . For our purposes, the important point is that the problem does not arise for pretence fictionalism. All the pretence fictionalist requires is that we have a reasonably coherent set of rule-governed practices for attributing mental states to people based on their behaviour. It does not require that we are able to distil any folk psychological principles or laws by reflecting on those practices. Indeed, as we noted above, the rules of most make-believe games-even children's games with dolls-are complex and difficult to formulate explicitly.
Eliminativism
Finally, let us compare fictionalism to eliminativism. Eliminativists claim that mental states, like beliefs and desires, do not exist. The eliminativist might offer various arguments for this claim: she might argue that folk psychology is a bad theory (Churchland 1981) , for example, or that it stands fundamentally at odds with particular developments in cognitive science (Ramsey, Stich and Garon 1990 ). As we have seen, the fictionalist need not follow the eliminativist in denying the existence of mental states;
instead, she might remain agnostic on the matter. The distinctive feature of fictionalism is that it allows us to grant that, even if mental states do not exist, we can nevertheless continue talking as if they do. This represents a clear advantage of fictionalism over eliminativism. Abandoning talk about beliefs, desires and other mental states would require an enormously dramatic and far-reaching transformation in our language. The fictionalist aims to show that the legitimacy of ordinary talk about the mind does not depend upon beliefs and desires finding a place in the theories of future cognitive science.
Why talk about mental states if they don't exist? According to the fictionalist, such talk shares the advantages of metaphorical and figurative language more generally. We have seen already that metaphors can allow us to make claims that we are unable to express in a straightforward literal description. But metaphorical and figurative language also brings 18 further advantages. Metaphors introduce a "framing effect" (Moran 1989 ; see also Demeter 2013b): we are asked to "see" our primary subject (e.g. Italy, clouds) in terms of a secondary subject (e.g. a boot, emotions) (Beardsley 1962; see also Hills 2011 
Challenges
I now turn to consider some objections to mental fictionalism. Each of these represents an important challenge facing the position, and I cannot hope to do justice to them properly here. But I hope at least to show that these objections need not be fatal and to indicate some possible lines of response.
The first, and most obvious, challenge concerns the phenomenology of talk about the mental (Wallace 2007 ; see also Eklund 2007 ). As we noted earlier, we don't normally feel as if we are engaging in pretence when we attribute mental states. When we say "John believes planes can fly" or "John wants to go to Madrid", we don't feel as if we are engaging in make-believe; we feel as if we are making a straightforward assertion about John. Of course, one response to this worry is to endorse a revolutionary fictionalism. But there are also ways that we might look to defend hermeneutic fictionalism against this objection. The first point to stress is one made a number of times already: on the pretence version of mental fictionalism, mental state attributions are used to make genuine assertions about people and their behaviour, albeit via pretence. Moreover, we need not insist that the folk pretend in the same manner as children participate in their games; for example, perhaps they merely indicate the relevant pretence, without engaging in it (Walton 1990 (Walton , 1993 .
More positively, the fictionalist might point out that we often don't notice when we are speaking metaphorically, especially when metaphors are familiar to us (Yablo 2000 ; see also Ekland 2007). Once we reflect more closely on our talk about mental states, she might argue, we see that it bears striking similarities to metaphorical language. To support this claim, the fictionalist can draw on some well-known arguments for instrumentalism.
For example, Yablo (2000) notes that objects invoked in make-believe have problematic identity conditions (e.g. "is the fuse you blew last week the same as the one you blew today?"). In a similar vein, Dennett notes that "common intuition does not give us a stable answer to such puzzles as whether the belief that 3 is greater than 2 is none other than the belief that 2 is less than 3" (1987, p. 55) . Another characteristic feature of metaphors is that they invite "silly questions" (e.g. "What species is the monkey on your back?").
Many realist questions about mental states, I suggest, also strike us as silly questions (e.g. "Where exactly is John's belief about planes? Is it to the right or left of his desire to go to Madrid?").
The mental fictionalist might also support her interpretation of folk discourse by appealing to an "Oracle argument" (Eklund 2007 A second important objection to mental fictionalism is that it cannot account for the fact that mental states appear in causal explanation (cf. Sprevak 2013). If we say "John's desire to go to Madrid caused him to spend all his savings", we appear to cite a mental state as the cause of John's behaviour. And yet, if mental states are fictions, it seems that they cannot be causes. Is this a serious difficulty for the fictionalist? Consider other uses of metaphor in causal explanations. Suppose we say "the angry clouds caused Ruth to fetch her umbrella". Following Walton's analysis it seems that, when we say this, we are 21 saying that the clouds were in a certain state S-whatever it is-such that, fictionally, we speak the truth, and this state S caused Ruth to fetch her umbrella. Even if there are no angry clouds, it is arguable that this is still a genuine causal explanation. Similarly, if we say "John's desire to go to Madrid caused him to spend all his savings", we are claiming that John is in a certain state S-whatever it is-such that, fictionally, we speak the truth, and this state S caused him to spend all his savings. Once again, even if there are no desires states, it is arguable that this is still a genuine causal explanation. But, of course, it falls far short of the idea that folk psychological explanations pick out discrete inner causes of behaviour, and there is certainly much more to be said here (for a related discussion, see Dennett 1987, pp. 56-57) . Churchland (1981) argues that the charge of self-refutation begs the question against eliminativism: it assumes that we must explain what happens when someone makes an assertion (puts forward an argument, defends a position, etc.) in folk psychological terms.
And yet this is exactly what the eliminativist denies. Eventually, according to eliminativism, we will come to possess a proper neuroscientific theory of such activities 22 which is radically different from that offered by folk psychology. At present, however, we have no alternative but to describe activities such as assertion using folk psychological notions. The mental fictionalist might take a similar line. The fictionalist's central claim is that the practice of folk psychology should be understood in a similar way to activities such as playing games or engaging with fiction. Eventually, we might come to possess a proper neuroscientific account of such activities which is radically different from that offered by folk psychology. At present, however, we have no choice but to describe these activities using folk psychological notions such as pretence and make-believe.
